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ABSTRACT 
 
School Attendance of Children and the Work of Mothers: 
A Joint Multilevel Model for India*
 
This paper investigates the determinants of school attendance of children and their mother’s 
working status when the mother decides how to allocate her time and that of her children. A 
multilevel random effects model is applied to study the mother’s participation and the 
schooling status of her children in a joint framework. Using the second National Family 
Health Survey (NFHS-2) for India, we find that, controlling for many covariates among which 
wealth is the most powerful predictor, children of working mothers have a lower probability of 
attending school. This, together with the result that only illiterate and poor mothers with 
unskilled or unemployed partners have a high probability of working, points to the need for 
decent labour market opportunities for females. An implication of our findings is that any 
policy aiming both at enhancing women’s empowerment through labour and increasing 
children’s welfare should also target improvements in women’s conditions in the labour 
market. 
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 1 Introduction 
Child schooling is universally acknowledged as one of the prerequisites of human development. 
Although there is less agreement on the role of labour for women, its empowering function is hardly 
denied. In fact, it is generally thought that women who contribute to household resources have a 
higher command of them, since earnings from their own work should represent an easier resource to 
control (see, for a study on developing countries, Desai and Jain, 1994).  
Even if there is a huge literature on the effects of mothers’ schooling on children’s schooling (see, 
for recent examples, Behrman and Rosenzweig, 2002; Plug, 2004), so far, economists have tended 
to study mothers’ work and children’s schooling in separate settings. However, these aspects are 
recognized to be interdependent, as recently emphasized by some international institutions (for 
example UNICEF, 2007 and 2008). Evidence drawn from a model where children’s schooling and 
mothers’ work are treated as interdependent phenomena has revealed that, in India, children of 
working mothers have a lower probability of schooling and a higher probability of working 
(Francavilla and Giannelli, 2007). That model, however, did not take into account unobserved 
heterogeneity, that is, the residual correlation among the outcomes of mothers and the outcomes of 
their children. In this paper, we develop a model to derive a measure of this correlation, since a 
significant value of this parameter would support the hypothesis of the joint nature of the time 
allocation decisions of mothers. Moreover, the sign and the size of this correlation would answer 
our question on the direction and magnitude of the relation between children’s schooling and their 
mothers’ work.  
In order to extend the model to this possibility, this paper employs a multilevel random effects 
model to investigate the determinants of children’s schooling and mothers’ work in a joint 
framework. Under the hypothesis that children’s time is an extension of their mother’s time, the two 
observed outcomes are the working status of the mother and the schooling status of each one of her 
children. We assume that working and schooling statuses are determined by the two underlying 
mother’s utilities for working and for sending each child to school. The covariates are distinguished 
into child-level and mother-level. We specify a two-equation linear model for these utilities under 
the assumptions that children of the same mother share the same mother-level error such that the 
child equation becomes a random effects probit. Also, the mother equation has an error structure 
that allows for correlation between the mother and child equations. We aim at estimating two 
parameters: the residual correlation of the utilities of working and sending each child to school 
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(mother-child correlation), and the residual correlation of the utilities of schooling among siblings 
of the same mother (within class correlation).  
Controlling for covariates, among which wealth is the most powerful predictor, we find that 
the mother-child correlation is significant and negative. That is, if mothers work, children may 
contribute to housework or to household income instead of attending school. Moreover, a 
significant and quite large within class correlation suggests that, all things being equal, mothers tend 
to choose the same state for each child. Indeed, some gender discrimination is present (males have a 
higher probability of studying), but the size of this correlation is such that preferences for treating 
all children equally seem to dominate, especially in poor families. As to the mother’s employment 
decision, our results show that mothers have a higher probability of working when they are 
illiterate, poor and have unskilled or unemployed partners. This evidence diverges sharply from 
what is generally found for developed countries. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sketches the theoretical model, while Section 3 
outlines the econometric model. Section 4 describes the data and the variables, while Section 5 is 
dedicated to the presentation and discussion of the results. Section 6 concludes. 
2 A theoretical model of maternal allocation of time of the child 
Since our focus is on the mother-child relation, our model is based on the following assumptions on 
the household decision making process. It is general wisdom, confirmed by a large amount of 
evidence drawn from data on the use of time, that school age children spend more time with their 
mothers than with their fathers (see, for example, Yeung, Sandberg, Davis-Kean and Hofferth, 
2001). Exploiting this stylised fact, although parental decisions about the education of children have 
been modelled in many different ways,1 we assume that the mother has the main opportunity to 
manage her children’s time.2 We therefore develop a model in which the time of the child is 
assumed to be an extension of the time of their mother, who decides how to allocate it. The father’s 
behaviour is exogenous to the model; he always works in the market and gives the family a labour 
income Y. The family consumes a bundle of home produced goods (Xd) and market (Xm) goods, 
and the mother (M) has to allocate her time between hours of domestic activities, HM,d, market 
work, HM,m, and leisure, L. The time of the child is an extension of their mother’s time, and the 
mother decides how to allocate it between study and work.  
                                                 
1 See Bourguignon and Chiappori (1992) on the collective versus unitary approach to the analysis of household 
allocation of time. 
2 Even if, especially in some developing countries, decisions on schooling may be taken exclusively by fathers, the fact 
that fathers usually spend most of their time outside home, gives some support to our hypothesis. 
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The mother maximises her utility function U (X, L, S),3 where X is the sum of home produced 
goods (Xd) and market goods (Xm), and S is hours of schooling of her child. S necessarily includes 
going to school, but also includes hours of all those extra activities (including play time or time 
spent studying with their mother) necessary to develop the capabilities of her child. The inclusion of 
S as an argument of mother’s utility can have a double interpretation. First, an altruistic 
interpretation, according to which, the mother derives utility from the fact that her child attends 
school. The second interpretation is egoistic, since the mother may guarantee herself future 
consumption by means of the support of her child,4 investing in their education. This implies the 
reasonable assumption that the child’s returns on human capital are higher if they accumulate at 
least some education instead of only work experience. Under these hypotheses the mother’s utility 
to be maximized is simply: 
 
Max U=U (X, L, S) (1) 
0>
X
U
δ
δ
, 0>
L
U
δ
δ
, 0>
S
U
δ
δ  
 
The utility maximization is subject to the consumption constraint: 
 
X= Xd+ Xm (2) 
 
The time constraint, with the time of the child (TC) considered like an extension of their mother’s 
time (TM ),  is the following: 
 
T= TM + TC  (3) 
TM = HM,d+ HM,m+L  (4) 
TC = HC,d+ HC,m +S  (5) 
 
where the time of the child can be allocated to domestic production (HC,d), market work (HC,m) and 
study (S). The mother and the child produce a homogeneous domestic good Xd according to the 
following household production constraint:  
 
                                                 
3 If the mother were altruistic and cared about the child’s utility (in other words, if the child’s utility was an argument of 
the mother’s utility function) the qualitative results would remain unchanged. 
4 For the theory of family constitutions, according to which parents invest in their children’s education in order to 
guarantee themselves consumption when they are old, see Cigno (2006) and Cigno and Rosati (2000). This theory is 
especially applicable to developing countries, where social security is often insufficient. 
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Xd = f(HM,d) + g(HC,d) (6) 
 
where f(HM,d) and g(HC,d) are the mother and the child household production function respectively 
and f’(Hd)>g’(Hd), that is, the mother is more productive than her child. The budget constraint is: 
 
Xm=WMHMm+ WCHCm + Y (7) 
 
where WM and WC are mother’s and child’s wages respectively.  
The graphical solution of this model is represented in Figure 1.  
Figure 1 – Mother participates to the labour market and child studies all the time 
S=TCTM
X
subsistence line
HM,d HM,m L
Mother’s indifference curves
Mother’s production frontier
Child’s production frontier
L,S
EM
EC
F
A
B
D
G
Y
 
 
The vertical X-axis divides T into two parts, TM in the left panel with the household production 
function in the case of absence of the child in the household mother’s production frontier, and TC in 
the right panel with the child’s production frontier. At the intersection of the X-axis with the L, the 
S-axis might be positive and equal to Y market goods (bought, for example, with the father’s 
earnings). The dashed line intersects the subsistence consumption level of the family. All 
combinations of mother and child work could be represented by varying the level of wages, the 
form of the home production functions and the mother’s preferences. In Figure 1 we show two of 
the possible combinations: one for the case in which the mother relies only on her time and the 
other for the case in which she considers her child’s time as an extension of her time. In the first 
case, at the equilibrium point EM, she works in the market, is engaged in home production and 
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enjoys some leisure time (see the left panel). In the second case she can increase her utility at the 
equilibrium point EC, where her child is engaged in full time education and S=TC (see the right 
panel). 
Other cases could be represented. For example, if a child spends time on all kind of activities, 
including study, the child’s equilibrium occurs at any point between F and G where g’(HCd)=WC. 
This allocation of the time of the child is jointly determined with their mother’s equilibrium. The 
latter may occur either between A and B where the mother participates (f’(HMd)=WM), or between B 
and D where the mother specializes in domestic work (f’(HMd)>WM). 
Alternatively, in a situation of poverty where all family members are forced to allocate all their 
time to work, the mother has no choice over the way she can use her time. She has to produce a 
given minimum amount of domestic goods for her and her family’s survival. This activity will take 
all her time. If her time is not enough to achieve the household subsistence level, she will have to 
employ her child in domestic activities and/or send the child to the labour market.5  
This special case in which the mother chooses to allocate the total time T (hers and her child) 
to work would take place at the frontier solutions A and F as shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 2  - Subsistence: mother and child work all the time 
L,STCTM
X
subsistence line
HM,d HM,m HC,m HC,d
Mother’s production frontier
Child’s production frontier
A
F
 
                                                 
5 This case is similar to the “Luxury axiom” (Basu and Van, 1998). This axiom states that: “A family will send the 
children to the labour market only if the family’s income from non-child labour sources drop very low.” (p. 416).  
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3 An econometric joint model for mother’s work and children’s schooling 
We devise an econometric model reflecting the economic model outlined in the previous section. 
Let j=1,…,J  denote mothers and i=1,…,nj denote children aged 6-14 of mother j. The observed 
outcomes are the working status of the mother,  (1=working, 0=otherwise), and the schooling 
status of each of her children aged 6-14,  (1=attending school, 0=otherwise). We assume that 
working and schooling statuses are determined by the underlying utilities of the mother: 
( )m
jy
( )c
ijy
 
{ } { }( ) ( )1m mj jy y= ⇔ > 0   where  is the utility of mother j for working ( )mjy
{ } { }( ) ( )1c cij ijy y= ⇔ > 0
m
je
cu e
)
   where  is the utility of mother j for sending her child i to school ( )cijy
 
The covariates determining the utilities are distinguished into child-level covariates zij (child’s 
age and gender) and mother-level covariates xj (every covariate that is constant for a mother, such 
as: mother’s age and education, household structure, partner’s occupation, household’s wealth). 
We assume that the joint model for the utilities has two linear equations: 
 
   (mother equation) (8) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )m m m mj j jy uα= + + +β x
   (child equation) (9) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c c c c cij j ij j ijy α= + + + +β x γ z
 
with the following assumptions on the errors: 
1) The u-errors  have a bivariate normal distribution with zero means and the 
following variances and covariance: 
( ( ) ( ),m cj ju u
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 2 ( ) ( )1, , ,m c m cj j c j jVar u Var u Cov u u mcσ σ= = =
)
. 
The error  has a fixed variance to ensure identifiability. Note that the siblings share the 
same mother-level error .  
( )m
ju
( )c
ju
2) The residual e-errors  are independent and identically distributed with 
standard normal distribution, so 
( ( ) ( ) ( )1, , , jm c cj j n je e e…
( ) ( )( ) ( ) 1m cj ijVar e Var e= =  and ( )( ) ( ),m cj ijCov e e =  
. The errors have a fixed variance to ensure identifiability. Note 
that the normal distribution of the e-errors corresponds to a probit model for the 
probabilities. 
( )( ) ( )', 0 ( 'c cij i jCov e e i i= ≠ )
3) Every u-error is independent of any e-error. 
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The child equation is a random effects probit, since  varies between mothers and  varies 
within mothers. Also the mother equation has an error structure with two terms, but it is not a 
random effects probit since both  and  vary between mothers: indeed, the mother equation 
could be written with a single error term . Decomposing the error into two additive 
terms is just a trick to allow a correlation between the mother and child equations: in fact, the 
estimation methods for random effects models allow for correlated random effects and thus the 
introduction of the fictitious random effects  is a simple way to fit correlated equations via 
standard software.
( )c
ju
( )c
ije
( )m
ju
( )m
je
( ) ( ) ( )m m
j j jw u e= + m
( )m
ju
6
Systems of random effects equations have been used to deal with endogenous covariates in 
multilevel settings (Cochrane and Guilkey, 1995; Degraff, Bilsborrow and Guilkey, 1997). In such 
cases the outcome of an equation appears as a covariate in another equation. Here we take a 
different approach: in fact, our theoretical model postulates that the mother jointly allocates her 
time and that of her children, so the working and schooling indicators have to be modelled jointly, 
but not regressed on each other. Therefore, our econometric model has a SUR structure (Seemingly 
Unrelated Regressions: e.g. Wooldridge, 2002), where the outcomes do not appear as covariates and 
the equations are correlated through the error terms. 
To understand the properties of our econometric model it is essential to write down the model-
implied residual variances and covariances of the utilities. The term “residual”, which means “after 
adjusting for the covariates”, is written explicitly in the following definitions, but it is left implicit 
later on. The residual variances of the utilities are 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )| 1m m mj j j jVar y Var u Var e= + = +x 1 2=  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) 2| , 1c c cij j ij j ij cVar y Var u Var e σ= + =x z +  
 
The residual covariances/correlations of the utilities for any two siblings are 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 2' ', | , , ,c c c c cij i j j ij i j j j j cCov y y Cov u u Var u σ= =x z z  =
                                                
 
 
)mj
6 A minor drawback due to the use of the fictitious random effects  is the change in the scale of the mother 
equation since =1+1=2. Thus the mother equation is a scaled probit, i.e. a probit with a 
scale different from 1: in this case the scale factor is equal to 
( )m
ju
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) (m mj jVar w Var u Var e= +
2 , so the regression coefficients are 2  times the 
coefficients of an ordinary probit. Since a scaled probit is statistically equivalent to an ordinary probit, we divide the 
estimates by 2  to make them comparable to the results from an ordinary probit. 
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( ) 2( ) ( )' ' 2, | , , 1c c cij i j j ij i j cCor y y
σ
σ= +x z z   (10) 
 
The residual covariances/correlations of the utilities for a mother with one of her children are 
 
( ) (( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), | , ,m c m cj ij j ij j j mCov y y Cov u u ) cσ= =x z   
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2
, | ,
2 1
m c mc
j ij j ij
c
Cor y y σσ= +x z
   (11) 
 
Some relevant properties of the model are discussed in the following remarks: 
• The interpretation of the variance-covariance parameters 2cσ  and mcσ  is easier if they are 
transformed into correlations, namely the correlation of utilities among siblings (10) and the 
mother-child correlation (11). 
• The mother-child correlation (11) can be positive or negative depending on mcσ : a positive 
(negative) correlation means that mothers with a higher utility for working tend to have a 
higher (lower) utility for sending their children to school. 
• The random effects of the child equation (9), , summarize the effects of unobserved 
covariates at the mother level: the larger their variance 
( )c
ju
2
cσ , the greater the role of 
unobserved covariates and thus the higher the correlation among siblings, also called 
Intraclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC), which is strictly positive unless 2cσ =0. 
• Apart from correlations (10) and (11), any other correlation among utilities is null (e.g. 
among two mothers, among two children of different mothers). 
• Each slope has the usual interpretation in terms of change in the probit due to a unit increase 
in the corresponding covariate; however, the child equation (9) has random effects, so the 
slopes have a conditional meaning, i.e. they refer to the effect of the covariates conditional 
on the random effects  (in general, conditional effects are larger than marginal effects). ( )cju
• The mother-level covariates xj have different slopes for the effect on the utility for working, 
, and for sending children to school, . ( )mβ ( )cβ
 
To compute predicted probabilities we define a baseline mother and a baseline child by choosing a 
value for each covariate,  and *j =x x *ij =z z . The definition of the baseline mother also requires 
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the specification of the value of the u-errors (unobserved covariates), which we set to their mean, 
i.e.  and . Denoting with ( ) 0mju = ( ) 0cju = ( )Φ ⋅  the normal distribution function, the predicted 
probability that the baseline mother works is ( )( ) ( ) *m mαΦ + β x , while the predicted probability that 
the baseline child of the baseline mother attends school is ( )( ) ( ) ( )* *c c cαΦ + +β x γ z . 
4 Data and variables 
We draw our data from the National Family Health Survey (NFHS-2) 1998-1999, India (IIPS and 
ORC Macro, 2000).7 The NFHS-2 is a household survey with two different samples: a sample of 
around 92,500 households, who answered the Household Questionnaire, and a sample of around 
90,300 married women in the age group 15–49 who are members of the household sample and who 
answered the Woman’s Questionnaire. Data for the women comes from both questionnaires. The 
sample covers more than 99% of India’s population living in all 26 Indian states. The sample size 
for each state was drawn separately for urban and rural areas proportionally to the size of the urban 
and rural populations of each state.  
This survey is suitable to fulfil one of our objectives, that is, to analyse the schooling 
probability of children while controlling for the correlation that might arise from sharing the same 
home and, more importantly according to our theoretical model, the same mother. The data set has a 
multilevel structure, with children at level 1, mothers at level 2, households at level 3 and 
geographical areas at the upper level. This structure calls for multilevel, random effects models 
taking into account the correlations induced by the clustering. 
Our analysis is based on two samples: a sample for urban areas made up of 14,181 mothers and 
their 26,269 children and a sample for rural areas of 33,137 mothers and their 65,726 children. We 
distinguish school-age children (6 to 14 years old) in two categories, students and non-students. The 
category of students includes not only full-time students, but also children who study and work 
either for the market (a very small proportion, 0.26% of all students) or for the family business 
(whose number cannot be computed from the survey, due to the structure of the questionnaire).8 On 
the other hand, the category of non-students includes those children who do not attend school at all, 
since they work full-time either outside (3%) or for the family business (3.3%) or they are inactive, 
namely children who are not in one of the preceding categories, but that can be assumed to do some 
work, most likely domestic (12% of the whole sample of children). 
                                                 
7 We thank MEASURE DHS for providing this survey for India. 
8 At variance with most studies on child labour, we do not specify a category for work and study, in line with the focus 
of our paper, according to which this state is not entirely harmful if the children manage to reconcile study with work. 
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Mothers are classified either as working or not working. Precisely, a mother is defined to be 
working if she has worked in the last twelve months.9
The descriptive statistics reported in Table 1 show that in urban areas 91% of children study 
and 29% of mothers work, whereas in rural areas 80% of children study and 46% of mothers work. 
The child-level covariates zij for the child equation (9) are age and gender. The mother-level 
covariates xj for the mother equation (8) and for the child equation (9) include the number of 
members of the household (disaggregated by age group and distinguishing between siblings and 
other children), mother’s education and age, partner’s occupation, religion of the household head, 
household wealth,10 acres of land owned by the household, and five dummy variables for 
geographical areas. A careful control of household composition is important in India, where many 
families may cohabit in the same household. 
A two-way table of the proportions of children attending school by age and number of siblings 
shows that the probability of studying decreases with age and also with the number of siblings 
present in the household. In the econometric model, we control for the interdependent effects of 
birth order and number of siblings by using the child’s age and the number of siblings distinguished 
between the age groups 0-5 and 6-14.  
The mother’s education is described in Table 1 by a dummy variable, denoting mothers with at 
least one year of schooling (Mother is literate), and a quantitative variable for the number of years 
of schooling. Literate women amount to 69% in urban areas and 34% in rural areas. 
5 Results 
Fitting the joint model with the mother equation (8) and the child equation (9) is computationally 
heavy, so to select the best model specification we fitted the two equations separately.11 Then we 
fitted the joint model with also the two equations simultaneously,12 which also allows the 
                                                 
9 We prefer to use this variable, instead of one indicating if the woman is currently employed, since it is more suitable 
to study the woman’s long-run attachment to the labour market in conjunction with the long-run decision of sending her 
children to school. 
10 The indicator variables to be included in the wealth index are all household assets and utility services, including 
country-specific items. See Rutstein and Johnson (2004) for details. 
11 In searching for a flexible specification each numerical covariate was tested for quadratic effects, but for the sake of 
parsimony cubic effects were not considered. 
12 All the models are fitted using the maximum likelihood algorithms of Stata. The mother equation is a standard probit, 
so it can be fitted in a few seconds using the probit command. On the other hand, the child equation is a random 
intercept probit and it can be fitted in a few minutes using the xtprobit command. The computational burden of 
random effects models is due to the aproximation of the integrals through adaptive Gaussian quadrature. Fitting the two 
equations simultaneously is not possible with standard Stata commands, but it is feasible with the user-written, freely 
downloadable gllamm command (Rabe-Hesketh, Skrondal and Pickles, 2004). Also gllamm is based on adaptive 
Gaussian quadrature, but it is computationally less efficient than xtprobit, so the task of fitting the joint model takes 
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estimation of the covariance mcσ  between the u-errors of the two equations and thus the mother-
child correlation (11). The estimates for the two equations change only slightly when passing from 
separate to simultaneous fitting. 
In this section we first show the results from the child equation, then the results from the 
mother equation and finally we discuss the findings of the mother-child correlation.  
We compute the predicted probabilities that a child attends school and a mother works using 
the following definitions of baseline child and baseline mother (see Section 3): 
• Baseline child: female aged 13. 
• Baseline mother: aged 34, illiterate, with 2 children aged 6-14 and no child aged 0-5, 
whose partner is unemployed or unskilled, living in a household in the South with the 
following features: the household has a single family, the head is Hindu, the household 
has no acres of own land and the wealth is at the first quartile of the area (0.1902 for 
urban and −1.0224 for rural). Moreover, the baseline mother has a mean value on the 
unobserved covariates, namely ( ) 0mju =  and ( ) 0cju = . 
                                                                                                                                                                  
several days. The gllamm command is designed to fit Generalized Linear Latent and Mixed Models (GLLAMM: 
Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh, 2004), a broad class that encompasses also our bivariate two-level model. 
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Table 1 - Definition of the variables and descriptive statistics 
Mother-level variables Urban (n=14181) Rural (n=33137) 
Name Mean S. Dev. Min Max Mean S. Dev. Min Max
Mother is working 0.287 0.453 0 1 0.464 0.499 0 1
Number of children aged 0-5 0.526 0.772 0 6 0.765 0.900 0 7
Number of children aged 6-14 1.857 0.929 1 7 1.993 0.992 1 7
Presence of children aged 0-5 of other mothers  0.117 0.322 0 1 0.156 0.362 0 1
Number of household members over 14 2.801 2.210 0 23 2.845 2.276 0 26
Mother is literate 0.690 0.462 0 1 0.338 0.473 0 1
Years of mother's education 6.127 5.223 0 21 2.144 3.493 0 22
Mother's age 34.054 5.959 16 49 33.160 6.506 15 49
Head of household is Muslim 0.163 0.369 0 1 0.116 0.320 0 1
Head of household is Christian 0.063 0.243 0 1 0.053 0.225 0 1
Head of household in scheduled caste or tribe 0.216 0.412 0 1 0.334 0.472 0 1
Household wealth index 0.837 0.916 -1.419 2.789 -0.436 0.734 -1.529 2.713
Acres of land owned by the household 1.520 11.767 0 99.990 0.949 7.903 0 99.990
Partner's job: clerical or professional 0.227 0.419 0 1 0.077 0.267 0 1
Partner's job: sales 0.182 0.386 0 1 0.065 0.246 0 1
Partner's job: skilled manual 0.299 0.458 0 1 0.162 0.369 0 1
North 0.281 0.449 0 1 0.219 0.414 0 1
Central 0.140 0.347 0 1 0.209 0.406 0 1
East 0.123 0.328 0 1 0.201 0.401 0 1
Northwest 0.100 0.300 0 1 0.140 0.347 0 1
West 0.178 0.383 0 1 0.079 0.269 0 1
         
Child-level variables Urban (n=26269) Rural (n=65726) 
Name Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Child is attending school 0.908 0.288 0 1 0.795 0.404 0 1
Child’s age 9.965 2.561 6 14 9.740 2.549 6 14
Child is male 0.520 0.500 0 1 0.518 0.500 0 1
 
5.1 The child equation: does the mother care about all her children in the same 
way?  
The random effects probit model of equation (9) allows the detection of the factors affecting the 
schooling status of children and to quantify the residual correlation among siblings. The model has 
two levels (mother level and child level) even if the phenomenon has further levels above the 
mother, such as the household and the region levels. Including random effects for higher levels is 
conceptually simple, but computationally prohibitive. To check that neglecting higher levels is not 
harmful, we fitted the two-level model and computed robust standard errors with households as top-
level clusters (Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh, 2004). This is a way to assess how the standard errors 
are influenced by the correlation among children of different mothers living in the same household. 
Since the robust standard errors are only slightly bigger than the classical ones, the two-level 
specification seems to suffice.  
Our economic model postulates that such correlation is due to sharing the same utility-
maximizing mother. Indeed, in the child equation (9) all the children of a mother share the same 
mother-level error . If the residual correlation between the utilities for any two children ( )cju (10) is 
high, it means that, after controlling for the explanatory variables, mothers tend to treat their 
children in the same way and the probabilities of siblings to attend school are markedly pushed up 
or down by their mother’s utility. Maximum likelihood estimates of the child equation (9) are 
presented in Table 2. 
For each area, the first column reports the estimate of the slope, while the second column reports 
the predicted probability for a hypothetical subject differing from the baseline for a unit increase in 
the covariate under consideration. For example, the heading of the second column of the urban area 
informs us that in urban areas the baseline child of a baseline mother has a predicted probability of 
94.6% of attending school, while the value corresponding to the covariate Child is male informs us 
that, if the baseline is modified by switching sex from female to male, then the predicted probability 
becomes 96.8%. For numerical covariates a unit increase from the baseline is considered and when 
a quadratic term is present the predicted probability is reported only in the row corresponding to the 
quadratic term: for example, 84.7% is the predicted probability of attending school obtained if 
Child’s age is changed from 13 to 14 taking into account both the linear and the quadratic effect.  
Table 2 – Estimates for the child equation (9): a random effects probit model of the 
probability that the child attends school 
Urban Rural 
Covariates 
Estimate
Prob. 
(base= 
94.6%) 
Estimate
Prob. 
(base= 
56.2%) 
Child’s age: linear 1.199   0.989  
Child’s age: quadratic -0.066 84.7% -0.055 36.7%
Child is male 0.247 96.8% 0.749 81.7%
Number of siblings aged 0-5: linear -0.322    -0.274    
Number of siblings aged 0-5: quadratic 0.030  90.6% 0.027  46.4%
Number of siblings aged 6-14: linear 0.056*   0.096    
Number of siblings aged 6-14: quadratic -0.038  93.0% -0.037  52.7%
Presence of children aged 0-5 of other mothers -0.175* 92.4% -0.243  46.5%
Number of household members over 14 0.011* 94.7% 0.041  57.8%
Mother’s schooling: 5 years of education 0.486  99.2% 0.751  88.0%
Mother’s schooling: 6 years of education 0.062  99.3% 0.054  89.1%
Mother's age -0.012  94.5% -0.018  55.5%
Head of household is: Muslim -0.607  84.1% -0.575  33.8%
Head of household is: Christian 0.153* 96.1% 0.243  65.5%
Head of household in scheduled caste or tribe -0.104* 93.4% -0.275  45.3%
Household wealth index: linear 1.057    0.958    
Household wealth index: quadratic -0.107  99.4% -0.260  91.7%
Acres of land owned by the household: linear 0.590    -0.046    
Acres of land owned by the household: quadratic -0.006  98.6% 0.001  54.4%
Partner's job: clerical or professional 0.602  98.6% 0.578  76.8%
Partner's job: sales 0.246  96.8% 0.156  62.2%
Partner's job: skilled manual 0.145  96.0% 0.099  60.1%
Region: North -0.300  90.4% 0.048* 58.1%
Region: Central -0.211  91.9% 0.065* 58.7%
Region: East -0.221  91.7% -0.104  52.1%
Region: Northwest 0.337  97.4% 0.345  69.2%
Region: West -0.145* 92.8% -0.047* 54.3%
Constant -2.575    -1.587    
cσ  1.445    1.260    
Intraclass Correlation Coefficient 0.676    0.614    
Unobserved factors at 10th percentile ( ( ) ˆ1.282cju cσ= − ) -1.282  40.3% -1.282  7.2%
Unobserved factors at 25th percentile ( ( ) ˆ0.674cju cσ= − ) -0.674  73.6% -0.674  24.4%
Unobserved factors at 75th percentile ( ( ) ˆ0.674cju cσ= + ) 0.674  99.5% 0.674  84.3%
Unobserved factors at 90th percentile ( ( ) ˆ1.282cju cσ= + ) 1.282  100.0% 1.282  96.2%
*Not significant at the 5% level.       
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The effect of the mother’s education is modelled through a dummy variable (Mother is 
literate) and a numeric variable (Years of mother’s education): since switching the dummy while 
keeping the numeric at zero is meaningless, the predicted probability corresponding to Mother is 
literate is computed for a mother who is literate with 5 years of education. Then the predicted 
probability corresponding to Years of mother’s education is computed for a mother with one further 
year of education, i.e. literate with 6 years of education. 
Starting with child-level covariates, we find that the child’s age has a significant quadratic 
effect and males have a higher probability of studying. To appreciate the role of age and gender it is 
important to see how they affect the predicted probability of attending school, keeping all the 
mother-level covariates at the baseline value, as in Figure 3. 
The probabilities are very high and almost constant for ages 7 to 11. The lower values at age 6 
are likely to be due to delayed entry or imperfections in age recording, while the decay starting at 
age 12 reflects school drop-out. The gender gap is modest in urban areas and relevant in rural areas, 
especially for ages 12 to 14. 
The household structure has an important role for the probability of studying. Larger numbers 
of siblings aged 0 to 5 are associated with lower probabilities of attending school, even if the 
quadratic term implies a decreasing marginal effect of additional siblings. 
 
Figure 3 – Predicted probability of attending school on child’s age, by area and gender  
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This effect is similar in urban and rural areas, with a slightly larger value in the former. On the 
contrary, the other aspects of household composition are markedly different in the two areas. The 
number of siblings aged 6 to 14, the presence of children of other mothers in the household and the 
number of all other members over 14 do not have significant effects in urban areas, whereas in rural 
areas these effects are significant. In particular, in rural areas, siblings aged 6 to 14 reduce the 
probability of studying by a small amount (but the quadratic term implies a decreasing marginal 
effect of additional siblings), the presence of children aged 0 to 5 of other mothers reduces the 
probability by the same amount of siblings of the same age, whereas the presence of other members 
in the household helps to improve the child’s chances of going to school. These results suggest that 
in rural areas there is a sort of “pooling effect” of members of different families in the same 
household. For example, the number of all small coresident children reduces the probability of 
schooling of any school-age child present in the household, as if a small child absorbed time and 
income resources of the household as a whole irrespective of their own mother. In the same line of 
interpretation, any adult member may contribute by offering time and income to the household, thus 
securing better conditions for school-age children. This “pooling” effect is less likely in urban areas, 
where the provision of services for the family may be external to the household. 
As for the mother’s features, education has a crucial role, mostly in rural areas. An illiterate 
mother is detrimental for the schooling chances of her children and the higher the number of years 
of education of the mother, the higher the probability that her children attend school, thus 
confirming a well established result in the literature. The mother’s age has a small negative effect, 
which we attribute to a cohort effect.  
As to household characteristics, the religion of the head is relevant: compared to Hindu, the 
probability of attending school is lower for Muslim and higher for Christian. Also being in a 
scheduled caste or tribe proves to be negative for children’s opportunities, especially in rural areas. 
 Household wealth is a very strong predictor that affects the probability of schooling in a 
quadratic way. In both areas the marginal effect on the probability is positive and decreasing, so a 
given difference in wealth is very important for poor families and negligible for rich families. 
Figure 4 shows the plot of the predicted probability of attending school against values of the wealth 
index in the observed range, when the other covariates are at baseline values. Children’s schooling 
is strongly influenced by wealth with a plateau for values of the index above 1. The curves for 
urban and rural areas are very close: therefore, all things being equal (in particular wealth), the 
chance of attending school is similar in the two areas. However, the distribution of wealth is 
markedly different in the two areas, as pointed out by the median value highlighted in the picture: 
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this fact explains the large gap in the sample proportions of children attending school in urban and 
rural areas. 
Acres of land owned by the household have an opposite effect in urban and rural areas. In 
urban areas they capture a pure wealth effect, that is, land ownership increases the child’s 
probability of schooling. In rural areas the effect is peculiar: a few acres of land property decrease 
the probability of schooling, since children are expected to engage in the family agricultural 
activities, but as the number of acres of land owned rises, the effect tends to become a pure wealth 
effect, thus increasing the probability of studying (the fitted parabola has a minimum at 23 acres). 
 
Figure 4 - Predicted probability of attending school on household wealth index, by area 
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Turning to the professional position of the partner of the mother, we find that partners in 
higher positions increase the probability of children attending school, since skilled workers, 
salesmen and, especially, clerical/professional workers have a significant and positive effect as 
compared to the unskilled workers or the unemployed.  
Let us now turn to discuss unobserved heterogeneity. The random effects  represent 
unobserved factors at the mother level. Their standard deviation 
( )c
ju
cσ  is estimated to be significant 
and very high: 1.445 in urban areas and 1.260 in rural areas. Thus an increase of one in the value of 
the standard deviation of the unobserved factors at mother level is associated with an increase of 
1.445 and 1.260, in urban and rural areas respectively, in the probability of sending children to 
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school. This effect is larger than any other observed covariate effect. It is instructive to consider 
some scenarios by computing the predicted probability of attending school for a few values of : 
since the random effects have a normal distribution with zero mean and standard deviation 
( )c
ju
cσ , 
interesting values are ( )cju k cσ=  for k taken at the 10th percentile (−1.282), at the 25th percentile 
(−0.674), at the 50th percentile (0), at the 75th percentile  (+0.674),  and at the 90th percentile 
(+1.282) of the distribution. The predicted probability for ( ) 0cju =  is just the baseline reported in the 
headings of Table 2, while the predicted probabilities for the other values of k are reported in the 
last four rows of Table 2. If the mother has a high utility for sending her children to school due to a 
higher value of , it is almost certain that her children actually attend school (100% in urban 
areas and 96.2% in rural areas, when the covariates are at baseline values). Conversely, if the 
mother has a low utility for sending her children to school due to a lower value of , it is unlikely 
that they actually attend school (40.3% in urban areas and 7.2% in rural areas, when the covariates 
are at baseline values). Therefore, in this analysis unobserved heterogeneity plays a substantial role. 
( )c
ju
( )c
ju
The standard deviation of the random effects can be converted into the ICC (10) among the 
mother’s utilities of sending her children to school, yielding 0.68 for urban areas and 0.61 for rural 
areas. The size of the correlation confirms that the mothers’ tendency to treat all children the same 
way dominates other observed effects, like discriminating among children according to their age or 
sex. 
In order to check if the ICC is sensitive to the household’s wealth, we fitted the model on two 
sub-samples defined by the bottom and top deciles of the wealth index, reporting the results in 
Table 3.13
 
Table 3 – ICC for the child equation (9): estimates in the full sample and in sub-samples of 
wealth deciles (sample size in parenthesis) 
Full Sample Bottom wealth decile Top wealth decile 
Urban 
(n=26269) 
Rural     
(n=65726) 
Urban 
(n=4229) 
Rural 
(n=10237) 
Urban 
(n=2845) 
Rural 
(n=9206) 
0.68 0.61 0.66 0.61 NA+ 0.32* 
*Not significant at the 5% level. +Estimation algorithm did not converge  
                                                 
13 The sample sizes reported in the table are numbers of children, while the selection of the sub-samples is based on a 
mother-level covariate, so the decile sub-samples need not be one tenth of the full sample. Indeed, both sub-samples are 
larger than one tenth of the full sample, since the mothers in the poorest and richest households tend to have more 
children. 
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Interestingly, the ICCs of the bottom decile are nearly the same as in the full sample, whereas 
in the top decile they drop sharply. This might indicate that a higher wealth gives the mothers more 
freedom to choose the schooling status according to the child’s observed characteristics. This is 
even more so in rural areas, where the ICC of the top decile shows the lowest value and is not 
significant (in urban areas it could not be estimated due to a very low variation in the outcome).  
5.2 The mother equation: what determines the mother’s decision to work? 
Maximum likelihood estimates of equation (8) are presented in Table 4. The child-level covariates 
are obviously not usable. We tried all the mother-level covariates considered for the child equation, 
but we found fewer significant effects, so the final specification is simpler. 
 
Table 4 - Estimates for the mother equation (8): the probability that the mother works 
Urban Rural 
Covariates 
Estimate
Prob. 
(base= 
51.3%) 
Estimate 
Prob. 
(base= 
81.5%) 
Number of children aged 0-5 -0.150  45.3% -0.107  78.6%
Number of household members over 14 -0.025  50.3% -0.023  80.9%
Mother’s schooling: 5 years of education -0.541  43.7% -0.331  71.8%
Mother’s schooling: 6 years of education 0.070  46.5% 0.002 * 71.9%
Mother's age 0.020  52.1% 0.000 * 81.5%
Head of household is: Muslim -0.149  45.4% -0.246  74.3%
Head of household is: Christian 0.368  65.6% 0.495  91.8%
Head of household in scheduled caste or tribe 0.152  57.3% 0.305  88.6%
Household wealth index: linear -0.535    -0.376    
Household wealth index: quadratic 0.090  35.3% 0.086  66.7%
Acres of land owned by the household: linear -0.020*   0.063    
Acres of land owned by the household: quadratic 0.000* 50.5% -0.001  83.2%
Partner's job: clerical or professional -0.254  41.2% -0.099  78.8%
Partner's job: sales -0.415  35.1% -0.234  74.7%
Partner's job: skilled manual -0.328  38.4% -0.137  77.7%
Region: North -0.044* 49.5% -0.669  59.1%
Region: Central -0.149  45.4% -0.613  61.2%
Region: East -0.441  34.1% -1.072  43.1%
Region: Northwest 0.019* 52.0% -0.722  57.0%
Region: West 0.137  56.7% 0.266  87.8%
Constant -0.640    0.424     
*Not significant at the 5% level       
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Own children aged 0 to 5 reduce the probability of working in both areas, but more in urban 
ones. Own children aged 6 to 14 and children of other mothers present in the household do not have 
significant effects, thus they are excluded from the final specification. The number of members 
aged 14 and over has a negative effect, as if their work would substitute that of mothers. 
Literate mothers have a lower probability of working in rural areas, independently from the 
years of education. On the contrary, in urban areas the effect depends on the years of education: 
compared with illiterate mothers, the probability of working is lower for mothers with few years of 
education and higher for mothers with several years of education (for the baseline mother, which is 
illiterate, the predicted probability of working is 51.3%, that becomes 43.7% at 5 years of 
education, 46.5% at 6 years, 52.0% at 8 years, 57.6% at 10 years). 
As shown also in other studies (see, for example, Giannelli and Francavilla, 2007), these 
results reflect the problem of poor job opportunities for women. The majority of occupations held 
by women are generally low paid and unskilled, so that only women in a severe state of necessity 
would accept them. In this light, it is easier to understand the negative association between work 
and literacy. On the other hand, in urban areas job opportunities for women are more likely to 
include higher quality jobs, so the positive role of education in improving women’s autonomy 
through market labour is recovered. 
Consistently with the standard model of women female participation in developed countries, 
age has a positive effect, even if it is significant only in urban areas. Moreover, differences due to 
religion and caste/tribe are notable, especially in rural areas. 
As to wealth effects, the coefficients on a quadratic specification of the wealth index show that 
wealthier mothers have a lower probability of working. The marginal effects are decreasing (like for 
the probability of a child to study) and stronger in urban areas. Property of land has a significant 
effect only in rural areas, where the probability of working increases up to nearly 50 acres of land, 
and then declines. 
The partner’s professional position has a sound role, especially in urban areas. The position of 
salesmen seems to have the largest disincentive effect for women’s work. 
5.3 The correlation among child and mother equations: are maternal work and 
child schooling interdependent? 
As for the relation between mother’s work and children’s schooling, previous evidence has shown 
that children of mothers who do not work have a higher probability of attending school than 
children of mothers who do work. Moreover, when mothers work, children are more likely to work 
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or to be inactive, this result pointing to a certain degree of complementarity between the work of 
mothers and children (see Francavilla and Giannelli, 2007). This outcome would represent a 
problem for policy, since the work of mothers, through its empowering function, should be 
associated with a better condition of children. Instead, the “perverse” effect of complementarity 
would suggest the need for policies directed at improving the working conditions of women. Thus, 
estimating this relation has relevant implications for policy choices. 
Francavilla and Giannelli (2007) present a reference estimate of the probability of child work 
conditional on mother’s work showing a positive and significant coefficient. However, the 
estimated coefficient may be biased, since the covariate on mother’s work is likely to be 
endogenous. To circumvent this problem, the authors fitted a multinomial logit model of mother-
child states, thus assuming, without testing, the joint nature of these decisions. 
The model defined by the mother equation (8) and the child equation (9) explicitly recognizes 
the joint nature of the working and schooling decisions. Fitting the two equations simultaneously 
allows us to estimate the covariance mcσ  between the u-errors of the two equations and thus to test 
more properly the mother-child correlation (11).  
In urban areas the covariance mcσ  is significant and estimated as −0.2805, yielding a residual 
correlation of −0.11 between the utilities for working and sending children to school, after 
controlling for the observed covariates. The relationship is slightly stronger in rural areas, with a 
significant covariance of −0.3948 and a mother-child residual correlation of −0.18. The presence of 
a significant mother-child correlation supports the interdependence hypothesis and the consequent 
choice of a joint model. Moreover, the mother-child correlation is negative (that is, if the mother 
works the child is less likely to attend school), thus confirming the previous evidence on the 
complementarity between maternal work and child labour (or between maternal work and child 
“inactivity”).  
At first sight, the estimated mother-child correlation seems modest in both areas. However, 
such a correlation concerns latent variables, while its impact on observed responses is substantial. 
To clarify this point, note that the bivariate normal distribution of the u-errors implies 
, so if a mother in a rural area (( )( ) ( ) ( )|c m mj j mc jE u u uσ= ˆmcσ = −0.395) is at the third quartile of the 
unobserved factors determining the working status ( =0.674), that is if this mother has a high 
propensity to work, then the mean value of the unobserved factors determining the schooling status 
of one of her children is =−0.395×0.674=−0.266. Such a shift makes the predicted 
probability for the baseline child decrease from 56.2% to 45.6%. Taking the 90
( )m
ju
( ( ) ( )|c mj jE u u )
th percentile 
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( =1.282) the predicted probability goes down to 36.3%. Specular changes of similar magnitude 
are obtained by considering mothers with low values of . 
( )m
ju
( )m
ju
Like for the ICC, in order to check if these results are sensitive to the household’s wealth, we 
fitted the model on two sub-samples defined by the bottom and top deciles of the wealth index, 
reporting the results in Table 5. 
 
Table 5 – Correlation between mother’s work and child schooling: estimates in the full sample 
and in sub-samples of wealth deciles (sample size in parenthesis) 
Full Sample Bottom wealth decile Top wealth decile 
Urban 
(n=26269) 
Rural     
(n=65726) 
Urban 
(n=4229) 
Rural 
(n=10237) 
Urban 
(n=2845) 
Rural 
(n=9206) 
−0.11 −0.18 −0.19 −0.14 NA+ -0.01* 
*Not significant at the 5% level. +Estimation algorithm did not converge 
 
We use these correlation coefficients (Table 5, col. 3 and 4) to calculate the probability of 
schooling of children living in households at the bottom deciles of the wealth scale. In these cases, 
if mothers have a high propensity to work (90th decile of unobserved factors) the probability of 
child schooling drops, from a baseline value of 56% in rural areas, to 40% and to 33% in rural and 
urban areas respectively (note, for rural areas, that the coefficient reported in col. 4 is higher in 
absolute value than the coefficient in col. 2, so the drop in the bottom decile sample is smaller than 
in the full sample. Instead, the drop in the schooling probability is larger for poorer households 
living in urban areas).  At the top of the wealth scale, this is no more so, since the coefficient turns 
out to be very small and insignificant in rural areas, and not even derivable in urban areas, where all 
children are very likely to go to school.  
6 Final remarks 
Our theoretical model postulates that the mother jointly allocates her time and that of her children. 
Her optimal decision depends on the level of wages, on the form of the household production 
function and on her preferences. In principle, all combinations of mother’s work and child’s activity 
may occur. Our empirical model supplies evidence about the conditions under which each 
combination of mother’s and child’s statuses has a higher probability of being realized. 
We find that when the mother has a high utility for working, her child has a higher probability 
of being involved in labour and domestic activities. After controlling for mother’s, child’s and 
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household’s characteristics, a higher mother’s preference for working is negatively correlated with 
her child’s school attendance. This worrying outcome cannot be ignored and calls for additional 
investigation. Heterogeneity exists among wealth deciles and geographical areas. We find that, in 
urban areas poor mothers with a high propensity to work have a very low probability of sending 
their children to school, even lower than that of equally poor families in rural areas. Instead, at the 
top of the wealth scale, almost all children are very likely to go to school.  
Moreover, the high residual correlation between the utilities for any two children suggests 
that mothers tend to treat their children in the same way. Also, the attitude of the mother to 
discriminate among her children differs by areas and wealth deciles. While the intra class 
correlation coefficients of the bottom deciles are nearly the same as those of the full sample, in the 
top deciles they drop sharply, indicating that richer mothers have a higher opportunity to choose the 
schooling status according to their children’s observed characteristics. 
As to the mother’s employment decision, our results show that mothers have a higher 
probability of working when they are illiterate, poor and have unskilled or unemployed partners. 
This evidence diverges sharply from what is generally found for developed countries and brings 
concern for the condition of women in the labour market. The negative association between the 
employment of mothers and schooling of their children reinforces this concern. An implication of 
our findings is that any policy aiming both at enhancing women’s empowerment through labour and 
increasing children’s welfare should also target improvements in women’s conditions in the labour 
market. However, since unobserved heterogeneity plays a substantial role in our results, further 
research with more detailed data on the environment in which the households live, such as the 
presence and quality of schools and local labour market conditions, is needed in order to 
recommend adequate policy measures. 
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